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Abstract—As the de facto routing protocol for many Internet of
Things (IoT) networks nowadays, and to assure the confidentiality
and integrity of its control messages, the Routing Protocol for
Low Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) incorporates three modes
of security: the Unsecured Mode (UM), Preinstalled Secure Mode
(PSM), and the Authenticated Secure Mode (ASM). While the
PSM and ASM are intended to protect against external routing
attacks and some replay attacks (through an optional replay
protection mechanism), recent research showed that RPL in PSM
is still vulnerable to many routing attacks, both internal and
external. In this paper, we propose a novel secure mode for
RPL, the Chained Secure Mode (CSM), based on the concept
of intra-flow Network Coding. The goal of CSM is to enhance
RPL’s resilience against several routing attacks, with the ability
to mitigate some of them. The security and performance of a
proof-of-concept prototype of CSM were evaluated and compared
against RPL in UM and PSM (with and without the optional
replay protection) in the presence of Neighbor attack as an
example. It showed that CSM has better performance and
more enhanced security compared to the PSM with the replay
protection. On the other hand, it showed a need for a proper
recovery mechanism for the case of losing a control message.
I. INTRODUCTION
Made into a standard in 2012, RPL [1] has attracted a
great deal of research interest. In particular, routing security in
RPL was of special interest, including different routing attacks
the protocol is susceptible to [2]–[4], mitigation methods and
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) [5]–[8], and performance
evaluation of some of RPL’s security mechanisms [9]–[12].
Raoof et al. in [9], [10] showed that RPL’s secure modes,
while providing reasonable mitigation of some external at-
tacks, are still vulnerable to many routing attacks (both internal
and external) - see §IV-A. In this paper, we propose a novel
secure mode for RPL - the Chained Secure Mode (CSM) -
which is designed using the principle of intra-flow Network
Coding (NC) [13], [14] to introduce an extra layer of security
for RPL control communications and to provide RPL with
mitigation capabilities against several routing attacks, while
keeping the same working principles of RPL - see §IV-B.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We designed a novel secure mode for RPL, the CSM.
This new secure mode uses the principle of intra-flow NC
* The authors acknowledge support from the Natural Sciences and Engi-
neering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) through the Discovery Grant
program.
to create a linked chain of coded RPL control messages
between every two neighboring nodes. The chaining
effect can limit adversaries’ ability to launch routing
attacks, e.g., a replay attack, identity-cloning, or some
RPL-specific attacks such as Rank or Version attacks [2].
• A proof-of-concept prototype of the proposed CSM was
implemented in Contiki Operating System (OS) [15].
• A security and performance comparison of the CSM
prototype to the currently implemented secure modes of
RPL (against the Neighbor attack) was conducted using
several metrics. The results showed that CSM is capable
of mitigating the attack with less overhead and power
consumption than PSM with the replay protection. In
addition, CSM showed enhanced security against other
types of attacks.
The rest of this paper goes as follows: Section II looks
into the related works. In section III an overview of RPL
and its security mechanisms is presented. The new secure
mode, CSM, is explained in section IV. Section V discusses
our evaluation setup and assumptions. Evaluation results are
discussed in section VI. Finally, the paper is concluded in VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Perazzo et al. in [16] provided an implementation of PSM
for RPL, along with the optional replay protection, named the
Consistency Check (CC) mechanism. Their work was based
on ContikiRPL (Contiki OS version of RPL). The authors
provided an evaluation for their implementation, and compared
RPL’s performance between PSM and UM. However, It was
noted that the replay protection mechanism introduced higher
network formation time and increased power consumption. An
optimized version of the replay protection mechanism was
introduced in [11] that uses RPL options [1] to include another
unique nonce value within the exchanged CC messages. The
evaluation of the optimized mechanism showed a 36% shorter
network formation time and 45% decrease in the CC messages
exchanged, while maintaining the same level of protection.
Airehrour et al. in [17] proposed a modified version of RPL,
named SecTrust-RPL. The authors used their devised SecTrust
framework [18], where the optimum route is chosen based on
trust evaluation of the nodes, resulting in isolating suspected
adversaries. Trust is calculated based on the successful packet
exchange between the nodes, and it is dependent on time.
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SecTrust-RPL was evaluated under the Decreased Rank and
Sybil attacks using Contiki OS in both simulation and a real
testbed. Compared to RPL in UM under the same attacks, their
implementation showed a significant decrease in lost packets
(≈60%) and lower rank changes among the nodes. However,
the authors did not evaluate the effect of their implementation
on power consumption and the End to End (E2E) latency.
III. RPL OVERVIEW
As a distance-vector routing protocol, RPL arranges the
network devices into a Destination Oriented Directed Acyclic
Graph (DODAG) [19]: a network of nodes connected without
loops with the traffic directed toward one root node [1], [20].
An important aspect of creating a DODAG is the Objective
Function (OF), which defines the used routing metrics, how to
calculate the rank1, and how to select parents in the DODAG,
among other essential configurations. To accommodate the
different applications and environments where RPL can be
deployed, RPL has several OFs [21]–[23] available for use
[2]. Also, deployments of RPL can have their own OFs.
Control messages in RPL have five types; four of them
have two versions (base and secure versions), and the last one
has only a secure version. When enabling any of the secure
modes of RPL (explained later in this section), the control
messages are switched to their secure versions, which add new
unencrypted header fields and either a Message Authentication
Code (MAC) or a digital signature field to the end of the base
version, then encrypts the base part and the MAC [1].
For the creation and maintenance of the DODAG, DODAG
Information Object (DIO) and DODAG Information Solici-
tation (DIS) messages are used [1]. The process starts with
the root node multicasting a DIO message that contains the
essential DODAG configuration and the root node’s rank (the
root node has the lowest rank in the DODAG). Each node
that receives a DIO message will perform the following: select
its preferred parent, calculate its own rank, then multicast a
new DIO with its calculated rank [1], [2]. DIS messages are
used to solicit DIO messages from node’s neighbors when it
is needed, e.g., a new node wants to join the networks or no
DIO messages have arrived for a long time [1].
Destination Advertisement Object (DAO) messages contain
path information about reachable nodes by its sender, and
depending on RPL’s mode of operation [1] it will be used
to create the downward routing table. Based to the DODAG’s
configurations, a flag in the DAO message will mandate a DAO
Acknowledgement (DAO-ACK) message from the receiver.
RPL standard offers a few security mechanisms to ensure
control messages’ confidentiality and integrity. Currently, RPL
has three modes of security [1], [16]: UM, where only the
link-layer security is applied, if available (default mode);
PSM, which uses preinstalled symmetrical encryption keys to
secure RPL control messages; and ASM uses the preinstalled
1The rank of a node represents its distance to the root node based on the
routing metrics defined by the OF
keys to let the nodes join the network, after that all routing-
capable nodes have to acquire new keys from an authentication
authority.
As an optional security mechanism that is only available in
the preinstalled (PSMrp) or authenticated mode (ASMrp), RPL
offers a replay protection mechanism named the Consistency
Checks. In these checks, a special secure control message (CC
message) with non-repetitive nonce value is exchanged and
used to assure no replay had occurred [1], [17].
IV. THE PROPOSED CHAINED SECURE MODE (CSM)
A. Motivations
The authors in [9], [10] examined RPL secure modes’
performance under several routing attacks, and have showed
that PSM (and by extension, ASM) is able to mitigate most of
the external attacks2, while it does not enhance RPL’s security
against the internal attacks3. Furthermore, their work showed
that external adversaries still can launch replay attacks, even
when PSMrp is used (e.g., in the case of the Wormhole attack.)
A further investigation of RPL standard [1] shows that
it only provides confidentiality and integrity of its control
messages, without any verification of their authenticity. This
opens the door wide open for attacks such as the Rank,
Version, Sinkhole, Sybil, identity cloning, eavesdropping, and
replay attacks [2] to be launched regardless of the secure mode
RPL is running in. For example, an external adversary can
launch a Neighbor attack (an attack that replays only DIO
messages) by merely monitoring the "Type" and "Code" header
fields in any Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6)
message to identify RPL’s DIO messages4, without the need
to decrypt the actual message [9].
The lack of message authenticity in RPL motivated us to
devise an innovative method to overcome this problem, and
NC came into the light as a possible solution. Incorporating
the intra-flow NC into RPL would provide any receiving node
with a proof of message authenticity, assuming that the first
message came from the original sender. This case stands true
for most attacks as the adversaries normally join the network
after it has been initiated and stabilized.
B. Brief Review on Network Coding
NC has received a great deal of attention since it was first
proposed by Ahlswede et al. [24]. Many researchers have
investigated NC schemes, e.g., XOR, Random Linear NC, etc.,
for improving network efficiency, e.g., throughput, reliability,
delay, using different communication technologies, e.g., wired,
wireless, or ad hoc networks [25]. The basic idea of NC is that
a source combines multiple pieces of information or packets
using a coding scheme and forwards the coded information to
2An external attack refers to an attack that is launched by an adversary
who is not part of the network, e.g., it does not have the encryption keys used
by the legitimate nodes for RPL in PSM, or runs RPL in UM.
3An internal attack is launched by an adversary who is part of the network,
e.g., it has the encryption keys used by the legitimate nodes for RPL in PSM.
4(Type = 155) means this is an RPL message. (Code = 1 or 129) means it
is a regular or secure DIO message, respectively.
the next network device. The receiver then, upon receiving
enough information, decodes the combined information to
recover the original data. The simplest NC scheme is XOR.
For instance, a device can perform bit-by-bit XOR operations
of two packets in sequence and forward the XOR-ed packet
to the next hop to reduce the number of transmissions.
NC can be applied to either inter-flow or intra-flow pack-
ets. Inter-flow NC applies coding to packets from different
flows, whereas intra-flow NC uses coding for packets of the
same flow [26], [27]. Inter-flow NC requires more complex
operations, such as buffering and synchronization of packets
from multiple flows or different sources. Intra-flow NC, on the
other hand, is much easier as it only considers the sequence
of packets within the same flow, which makes it suitable to
the resource-constrained Internet of Things (IoT) networks.
This paper proposes an innovative secure mode for RPL,
the CSM, using intra-flow NC, where RPL control messages
are encoded using a random secret value that is sent within
the previous control message. The chaining effect from this
method adds message authenticity to RPL and increases its
resilience against eavesdropping, manipulation, forging, and
replay attacks. For concept demonstration, we make use of
the simplest XOR NC scheme. To add extra security against
replay attacks that target certain types of RPL messages, CSM
also encodes the "Code" field of the ICMPv6 header of the
control message using the same secret value.
C. How CSM Operates
The simplest implementation of intra-flow NC is to encode
the current packet with the previous one from the same flow
using a simple XOR NC scheme. The receiver node should
always keep the previous packet so it can decode the incoming
message and retrieve the new packet.
A problem that arises when implementing the aforemen-
tioned concept in an IoT network is the limited resources
available for the nodes, which renders such implementation
impractical. As an example, if a node has 30 neighbors,
it should store the last 30 messages from these neighbors.
Assuming the average size for RPL control messages is 80
bytes [1], the receiving node has to reserve 2400 bytes (≈2.4
KB) from its limited memory so it can decode any received
message properly.
To overcome this problem, CSM uses Secret Chaining
(SC) values instead of the entire previous packet for the
encoding/decoding process. These SC values (currently in our
design) are 4 bytes long, randomly generated numbers, and are
locally unique for each neighbor. Compared to the example
mentioned above, the receiving node will store 120 bytes only
of the SC values instead of 2400 bytes. This is a huge saving
for the resource-constrained IoT nodes.
Since RPL sends its control messages as either an MC or
UC messages, CSM considers them as two flows (an MC-flow
or a UC-flow). Every node in the network should maintain a
table of the following SC values for each neighbor, named the
SC table:
1) SC_UC_RX: The SC value used to decode the next UC-
flow message from the neighbor.
2) SC_MC_RX: The SC value used to decode the next MC-
flow message from the neighbor.
3) SC_UC_TX: The SC value used to encode the next UC-
flow message to the neighbor.
In addition, each node should maintain the next SC value for
its next MC-flow transmission (SC_MC_TX). For simplicity,
all SC values start with zero for the first transmission of each
flow in the current proof-of-concept design.
To exchange the SC values used to encode the next control
message, CSM employs the RPL Control Message Options
from the standard [1]. These optional add-ons contain pieces of
information that informs the receiver(s) about routing metrics,
updates, or to request information. CSM adds two new options
to accommodate the transmission of the next SC used for each
flow: the (SC_UC_NEXT) option includes the SC value to be
used for the next UC-flow message, and (SC_MC_NEXT) is
for the SC value to be used for the next MC-flow message.
When a node wants to send an RPL control message
(whether for the UC- or MC-flow), it will prepare the message
as per the standard PSM procedures. However, two additional
steps are performed by CSM before encrypting the message
with the preinstalled key:
• The Code field of the ICMPv6 header is encoded using
the corresponding SC_UC_TX or SC_MC_TX value to
mitigate the security vulnerability addressed in §IV-A.
• Adding the (SC_UC_NEXT) and (SC_MC_NEXT) new
control message options, as per the RPL standard. CSM
should add both options for UC-flow messages and only
the (SC_MC_NEXT) for the MC-flow messages. The
use of both options for the UC-flow allows for quicker
recovery from message chain breakage in the MC-flow.
After encrypting the message, CSM will encode the whole
message using the corresponding SC value then send it as
usual.
At the receiving node, the decoding SC value is found from
the SC table using the sender and receiver IP addresses. The
found SC value is used to decode the Code field of the ICMPv6
header to identify the type of RPL message, then the whole
message is decoded using the same SC value and is processed
as per PSM procedures. Any message with non-decodable
Code field will be discarded without processing.
Except for the above mentioned requirements and proce-
dures, CSM follows the same rules dictated by the RPL PSM
standard. Fig. 1 shows examples of CSM normal operation.
V. EVALUATION OF THE CHAINED SECURE MODE
To evaluate our proposed CSM, we conducted a security
and performance comparison between our devised prototype
of CSM and the currently implemented secure modes: RPL
in UM (vanilla ContikiRPL), PSM, and PSMrp (both as in
Perazzo et al. [16] implementation). All the secure modes were
evaluated in both a normal operation and with an external
adversary launching a Neighbor attack [2] (as an example of
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Fig. 1. Examples of normal CSM operation in chronological order (the number outside the brackets is the SC value used to encode that message): (a and b)
the first message in the MC-flow, (c and d) the first message in the UC-flow, (e) subsequent messages of the UC-flow, and (f) subsequent messages of the
MC-flow. The yellow color highlights a creation or a change of an SC value in the SC table.
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Fig. 2. Network topology used for the evaluation.
replay attacks). Hence, two scenarios with four experiments
each were performed.
Cooja, the simulator for Contiki OS [15], was used for all
the simulations (with simulated motes). Fig.2 shows the topol-
ogy used in our evaluation. A list of simulation parameters is
provided in Table I.
For the purpose of the evaluation, the following metrics
were used: the average data packet delivery rate (PDR),
average data E2E latency, the number of exchanged RPL
control messages, and the average network power consumption
per received data packet.
The following assumptions were used in our evaluation: all
the legitimate nodes send data packets toward the root at a
rate of 1 packet/minute, while the adversary does not send
any data packets. For all the evaluated secure modes, RPL is
set up with the default OF, namely the Minimum Rank with
Hysteresis Objective Function (MRHOF) [22]. Contiki OS is
using the default settings for its uIP stack: IEEE 802.15.4 [28]
for the Physical layer and Medium Access Control (MAC)
sublayer, ContikiMAC [29] for the Radio Duty-Cycle (RDC)
sublayer, IPv6 and RPL at the Network layer, and UDP for
the Transport layer. To keep the focus on RPL at the Network
layer, we assumed neither security measures nor encryption
TABLE I
LIST OF SIMULATION PARAMETERS
Description Value
No. of scenarios Two (No attack + Neighbor attack)
No. of experiments per scenario Four (See §V)
No. of sim. rounds per exp. / time 10 rounds / 20 min. per round
Node Positioning Tree topology (single DODAG)
Deployment area 60m W x 85m L
Number of nodes 7 (adversary included)
Sensor nodes type Arago Sys. Wismote mote
was enabled at the Link layer.
For the adversary, it operates in the same RPL secure mode
as the legitimate nodes, but without the required preinstalled
encryption key (for PSM, PSMrp, and CSM experiments). The
adversary starts as a legitimate node, tries to join the network,
then launches the attack after two minutes.
The results obtained from the simulations were averaged
over ten rounds per experiment with a 95% confidence level.
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The results for the experiments are shown in Fig.3. It is
worth mentioning that we are evaluating a proof-of-concept
prototype of CSM that is not fully optimized.
A. Analysis of the Results
Effects on the data packet delivery rate (PDR): Looking
at Fig.3a, it is clear that PSMrp and CSM successfully elim-
inated the Neighbor attack effect, with both of them having
almost 100% PDR. UM suffered the most (≈ 80%) as the
attacker actually was able to become part of the network, while
PSM was only affected by a small margin (≈ 92%) as the
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
UM PSM PSMrp CSM
Average Packet Delivery Rate (PDR)
No Attack Neighbor Attack
(a)
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
UM PSM PSMrp CSM
Se
co
n
d
s
Average Network E2E Latency
No Attack Neighbor Attack
(b)
0
100
200
300
400
UM PSM PSMrp CSM UM PSM PSMrp CSM
Sent Received
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
C
o
n
tr
o
 M
es
sa
ge
s
Exchanged RPL Control Messages
No Attack Neighbor Attack
(c)
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
UM PSM PSMrp CSM
m
W
at
t
Mote's Average Power Consumption 
(Per Reeived Packet)
No Attack Neighbor Attack
(d)
Fig. 3. Simulation results for the two scenarios and the four experiments.
adversary affected only one node (node 5) when it replayed
the DIO messages it heard from nodes (1 and 2).
Effects on the data E2E latency: as pointed out in our
previous work [9], [10], Fig.3b shows that the Neighbor attack
normally introduces higher E2E latency to the network. This
is clear in the cases of UM (≈ 25 sec.) and PSM (≈ 5 sec.). On
the other hand, both PSMrp and CSM were able to mitigate
the attacks and kept the latency to its minimum.
Effects on the exchanged number of RPL’s control
messages: As seen in Fig.3c, the number of control messages
sent in the network is almost the same for all the secure
modes, with the attack increasing the number slightly. Under
the Neighbor attack, nodes running PSM are receiving way
more control messages than the other secure modes, due to the
many MC DIO messages from the nodes 5 and 6 to the "ghost"
parents (nodes 1 and 2). PSMrp nodes had a bit more control
messages received when the Neighbor attack is commenced,
compared to the no-attack scenario, due to the exchange of
the CC messages.
On the other hand, our CSM prototype has the least number
of received control messages, even less than what it had
been sent originally. It was observed that this is due to
some unicast DAO/DAO-ACK messages were lost (e.g., lossy
wireless connections), which broke the UC message flow and
resulted in having less received control messages than the sent.
It is worth noting that the number of received control
messages is always higher than the sent one because many
of the sent control messages are multicast messages which
will be received by all neighboring nodes of the sender.
Effects on power consumption: Fig.3d shows the average
network power consumption per received packet, as it gives
a more accurate look into the effect of the attack on the
power consumption than just using the regular average power
consumption readings. We can see that the power consumption
patterns for RPL in UM, PSM, and PSMrp are very similar,
with the attack increasing the power consumption a bit (due
to the undelivered data packets). However, it is noticeable that
our CSM prototype is using less power than the other modes.
From our observation, this behavior is because of the dropped
control messages (whether they are the replayed messages or
due to the message chain breakage).
B. Observations
Our observations from the evaluation experiments can be
summarized in the following points:
1) Enhanced Security Features of CSM: Those can be
summarized as follows:
i) CSM adds an extra layer of security by encoding the
control messages and chaining them with the SC values,
which limits the adversaries’ ability to eavesdrop on,
manipulate, forge, and replay RPL control messages.
ii) Because of the encoding of the Code field of the ICMPv6
header in CSM, external adversaries cannot identify the
type of RPL control messages (except for the first mes-
sage of each message flow, as it is encoded with zero
- see Fig.1c). Hence, external replay attacks that target
specific RPL control messages (e.g., the Neighbor attack)
are fully mitigated by CSM.
iii) The PSMrp mitigates only "one-way" replay attacks,
which only replay RPL control messages from a node
but not any correspondence. This proved to be ineffi-
cient with enhanced "two-way" replay attacks such as
Wormhole attacks [9]. Because CSM uses the chaining
of the control messages (by the SC values) as a message
authentication mechanism, all messages encoded with
unknown SC values will be discarded without the need
for a challenge/response mechanism as in PSMrp.
2) CSM Reduction of the In-threat Period: We define the
in-threat period as the time duration in which an adversary can
overhear and understand the whole or part of the exchanged
RPL control messages and launch attacks. This period ranges
between zero (the adversary cannot launch attacks success-
fully) to infinity (the adversary can launch attacks at any
time), depending on the secure mode used, the adversary type,
and the attack.
For UM, the in-threat period is infinity as the adversary can
understand RPL messages and launch attacks immediately. On
the other hand, the in-threat period for PSM can be either:
• Infinity for all internal adversaries or external adversaries
of replay/identity-cloning attacks. The former can decrypt
the whole control message with the preinstalled encryp-
tion key at any time, while the latter can identify RPL
control messages through the "Type" and "Code" fields of
the ICMPv6 header, then replay them at any other time
without the need to decrypt the contents.
• Zero for external adversaries of attacks that require a full
understanding of RPL control messages, because of the
lack of the used encryption key.
Due to the enhanced security caused by using intra-flow NC,
CSM limits the adversaries’ ability to launch several internal
and external attacks that are based on identifying and un-
derstanding RPL control messages. Hence, CSM significantly
reduces the in-threat period to either:
• The time period to receive the first UC message for all
internal adversaries. During this period, the adversary will
wait for the first UC control message (currently encoded
with zeros and has the SC values for both UC and MC
flows), so it can use the included SC values to decode any
following message from any message flow. After that, it
decrypts the message with the preinstalled encryption key.
• Zero for all external adversaries, due to the lack of the
used encryption key and the correct SC values.
To further reduce the in-threat period for CSM, RPL should
be forced to send the first UC message as soon as it finishes
processing the first MC message.
3) The Necessity of Proper Recovery Mechanism: For
any message flow (UC or MC), once a message is lost for
any reason, all the subsequent messages in that flow will be
discarded due to the message chain breakage. This could lead
to a disruption in the DODAG and suboptimal routes. On
the other hand, exchanging the missing SC values as clear
text would hinder the enhanced security of CSM and allows
adversaries to acquire the SC values, thus enabling them to
launch their attacks. Hence, a proper recovery mechanism that
assures secure exchange for the missing SC values is needed.
An example of such a recovery mechanism would be using
special (request/response) control messages that are encrypted
with a different encryption key than the preinstalled one used
for regular control messages.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new secure mode for RPL,
the Chained Secure Mode, to enhance RPL security and to
build a mitigation capability of several routing attacks into
the protocol itself, without significantly changing the way RPL
works. A proof-of-concept prototype of CSM was devised, and
its security and performance was evaluated against the cur-
rently implemented secure modes of RPL under the Neighbor
attack as a demonstration. It was shown that CSM successfully
mitigates replay attacks (e.g., the Neighbor attack) with less
overhead and power consumption than the other secure modes.
Also, it was shown that CSM has a significantly smaller
in-threat period than all other secure modes. However, our
evaluation indicated a need for a proper recovery mechanism
for message chain breakage situations.
We believe that the proposed CSM has a real potential to in-
crease RPL’s resilience against routing attacks. Our next steps
include adding a suitable recovery mechanism and evaluating
CSM’s performance under other routing attacks.
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